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Responding to David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step 
Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135 (2012).  
 
Carlos M. Vázquez * 
David Sloss’s article, Executing Foster v. Neilson, is an important contribution to the 
literature on the judicial enforcement of treaties.! I agree with much of it, as I agree 
with much of Professor Sloss’ other writing on treaties." In particular, I agree that the 
two-step approach to treaty enforcement that he proposes is generally the right 
approach, and I agree that the “intent-based” approach to the self-execution issue that 
                                                
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing 
Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., David L. Sloss, Self-Executing Treaties and Domestic Judicial Remedies, 98 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 364 (2004); David L. Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional 
Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002); David L. Sloss, The Domestication of International Human 
Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999). 
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he criticizes is highly problematic.# But Professor Sloss and I disagree about the 
source of this problematic approach. I have traced this approach to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson.$ Professor Sloss traces it to courts and scholars 
(including me) who, in his view, have misread Foster.% I shall address our differences 
on this point below. First, however, I shall explain my general agreement with the 
two-step approach to treaty enforcement that Professor Sloss defends.  
The much-controverted question of treaty self-execution is widely understood to 
concern whether a treaty may be enforced directly by the courts or must instead await 
legislative implementation.& Professor Sloss proposes a two-step analysis for 
addressing this question. The first step is to determine what the treaty obligates the 
United States to do.' This is a question of treaty interpretation, to be answered 
through the application of the international law of treaty interpretation. The second 
step is to identify which domestic officials have the power and duty to enforce the 
obligation.( This, Professor Sloss argues, is entirely a matter of U.S. domestic law, not 
a matter of treaty interpretation.) Courts and commentators have fallen into error, and 
produced much confusion, by treating the second question as one of treaty 
interpretation, seeking an answer in the text of the treaty or in the parties’ intent.!* 
Professor Sloss notes that treaties seldom address the question of which domestic 
officials—legislative, executive, or judicial—are responsible for enforcing the treaty.!! 
Instead, treaty parties almost always leave that question to the domestic law of the 
states-parties. 
Professor Sloss is entirely correct to note that seeking the answer to this question in 
the treaty itself is highly problematic. Although there is nothing in international law 
that prevents states from addressing that question in the treaty itself, the fact is that 
                                                
 
3 Sloss, supra note 1, at 163. 
4 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial 
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 607 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties as Law]; 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 700–
05 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, Four Doctrines]; Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. Neilson and 
United States v. Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in JOHN E. NOYES ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 167–68 (2007) [hereinafter Vázquez, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STORIES]; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
5 Sloss, supra note 1, at n.26 (citing Vázquez, Treaties as Law); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution 
and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131; Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law,” 88 
TEX. L. REV. 91 (2009). 
6 See Sloss, supra note 1, at 137. 
7 Id. at 143. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 137–40, 143, 162, 188. 
10 See generally id.; see, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008). 
11 Sloss, supra note 1, at 163. 
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states almost never do so.!" Domestic officials take their cues from domestic law, and 
states have very different constitutional rules concerning the need for legislative 
implementation of treaties.!# In the United Kingdom and most nations of the British 
Commonwealth, treaties are never enforceable in the courts until they have been 
implemented by legislation.!$ The constitutional law of other countries permits the 
direct judicial enforcement of some treaties but not of others.!% In the United States, 
for example, treaties that require the criminalization of conduct or the appropriation 
of money must be legislatively implemented because the Constitution has been 
interpreted to require a statute for those purposes.!& Because of the diversity of 
domestic constitutional rules on the question, states rarely, if ever, address the issue of 
domestic implementation in the treaties they conclude. Seeking an answer to the self-
executing question in the treaty itself is thus, in Justice Breyer’s words, like “hunting 
[for] the snark.”!' No matter how hard they look, the courts will almost never find an 
answer there.  
States instead leave the question to the domestic law of each state-party. The most 
relevant provision of our Constitution is the Supremacy Clause, which provides that 
“all Treaties” of the United States are “the supreme Law of the Land,” and instructs 
judges to give them effect.!( This clause, I have argued, was intended to reverse the 
British rule, which we would otherwise have inherited.!) It establishes that treaties in 
the United States do not, as a constitutional matter, always require implementing 
legislation, and it appears to establish that treaties are judicially enforceable in the 
same circumstances as constitutional and statutory provisions of like content."* The 
first task for a court confronted with a treaty should thus be to identify the treaty’s 
content, which, as Professor Sloss argues, is a matter of treaty interpretation."! The 
next step should to be to ask whether the obligation imposed by the treaty is one that 
would be judicially enforceable if it were found in a statute."" Thus, as with statutes, a 
treaty would not be judicially enforceable if it were unconstitutional—for example, if 
                                                
 
12 Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 607. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 679; DUNCAN B. BLAKESLEE ET AL., NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 733–
34 (2005). 
15 Id. at 17–18. 
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 111(4)(c) cmt.i, n.6 (1987). 
17 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
18 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
19 Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 698–99; Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 
614–15; Vázquez, INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 4, at 165. 
20 Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 602; Vázquez, INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES, 
supra note 4, at 167. 
21 Sloss, supra note 1, at 162. 
22 Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 602. 
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it purported to accomplish something for which the Constitution requires a statute, 
such as criminalization of conduct or appropriation of money."# Similarly, a treaty 
would not be judicially enforceable if it imposed an obligation requiring the exercise 
of political judgment. This category would include treaties that set forth aspirations or 
that contemplate the exercise of discretion requiring political judgment."$ But, as 
Professor Sloss correctly argues, a treaty imposing a nondiscretionary duty of 
government to behave in a determinate way towards individuals should not generally 
give rise to questions regarding its judicial enforceability at the behest of such 
individuals."%  
Regarding all of the above, Professor Sloss and I appear to agree. Our main point of 
disagreement concerns my claim that the Supreme Court in Foster recognized another 
category of non-self-executing treaty: treaties that are non-self-executing because the 
treaty parties intended that the United States’ obligation be subject to legislative 
implementation."& Professor Sloss contends that the Court in Foster did not treat the 
issue as one of treaty interpretation, but instead held that the treaty in question was 
non-self-executing because it imposed an obligation that required legislative 
implementation for constitutional reasons."'  
Even here, my disagreement with Professor Sloss is narrow: for the reasons that 
Professor Sloss highlights in his article, and that I have sketched out above, I have 
always regarded the intent-based category of non-self-execution as highly problematic. 
Because states rarely address the issue, courts will rarely find evidence of any intent 
regarding the need for legislative implementation. If they think that they have found 
evidence, they are almost certainly misreading the treaty, attributing to the parties a 
nonexistent intent."( I have accordingly argued that the Supremacy Clause should be 
understood to establish a strong presumption that a treaty was not intended to require 
legislative implementation, reversible only through clear evidence that the parties did 
so intend.") If Professor Sloss and I are right that the parties to a treaty rarely, if ever, 
address the question of implementing legislation, then the clear statement rule that I 
have proposed should lead the courts rarely, if ever, to find a treaty non-self-executing 
                                                
 
23 See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 718. 
24 See Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 631; Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 
718. 
25 Sloss, supra note 1, at 140–41. 
26 Sloss, supra note 1, at 153; Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 631; Vázquez, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 4, at 166–67. 
27 Sloss, supra note 1, at 157–58. 
28 Id. at 138 (citing Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 607). 
29 Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 602. 
2012 /Chief Justices Marshall and Roberts and the Non-Self-Execution of Treaties 217 
 
 
 
on the basis of the parties’ intent.#* Thus, my approach and that of Professor Sloss 
will almost always lead to the same result. 
Professor Sloss claims that this problematic approach to the self-execution question is 
based on a misreading of Foster.#! He argues that the Court in Foster determined that 
the obligation that the treaty imposed on the parties was one that required legislative 
implementation by virtue of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.#" Specifically, he 
argues that the treaty at issue in Foster conferred on the grantee only an inchoate or 
equitable title in the property at issue.## Legislation was required, according to 
Professor Sloss, because Article IV of the U.S. Constitution assigns exclusively to 
Congress the power to transform an inchoate title to property otherwise held by the 
United States into a perfect title.#$ 
Unfortunately, Professor Sloss’ attempt to reinterpret Foster lacks support in the 
Court’s opinion. Foster involved Article 8 of an 1819 treaty with Spain, which 
provided that  
all grants of land made before the 24th of January 
1818 by his catholic majesty, or by his lawful 
authorities, in the said territories ceded by his 
majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and 
confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, 
to the same extent that the same grants would be 
valid if the territories had remained under the 
dominion of his catholic majesty.#% 
 
                                                
 
30 The presumption that I have proposed relates only to the parties’ intent regarding the 
need for implementing legislation. See Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 667. I have not 
proposed an across-the-board presumption that treaties are self-executing. Cf., e.g., Jide 
Nzelibe, Partisan Conflicts Over Presidential Authority, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 389, n.53 (2011); 
Anthony S. Winer, An Escape Route From the Medellín Maze, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 331, n.13 
(2010); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, n.385 (2009). 
Thus, I do not claim that treaties should be presumed not to require implementing legislation 
because the obligations they establish require the exercise of political judgment. See Vázquez, 
Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 651; Vázquez, INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 4, at 
166–67.  
31 Sloss, supra note 1, at 157. 
32 Id. at 162. 
33 Id. at 161–62. 
34 Id. 
35 Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, U.S.–Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252. 
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Professor Sloss notes that some of the grants of land made by his catholic majesty 
conferred perfect titles and some conferred inchoate titles.#& If the Spanish grant 
conferred a perfect title, then the treaty, correctly construed, required the United 
States to recognize a perfect title, enforceable without prior legislative intervention.#' 
If the Spanish grant conferred an inchoate title, then the United States was only 
required to recognize an inchoate title, and, by virtue of Article IV of the 
Constitution, the power to transform and inchoate title into an actual title belongs to 
Congress.#( Professor Sloss points to a line of post-Percheman cases articulating this 
distinction and holding that legislation is required with respect to inchoate grants but 
not with respect to perfect grants.#) 
Foster, however, involved a Spanish grant of land located in territory that the Court in 
Foster held had ceased to belong to Spain in 1803.$* Because the grant related to land 
that was not within the “territories ceded by his catholic majesty to the United 
States,”$! a majority of the Court held that Article 8 was simply inapplicable.$" For 
these Justices, the analysis ended there. The portion of the Foster opinion that has 
come to be understood as recognizing the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties was 
relevant only to Chief Justice Marshall and one other Justice, and that was because 
these two Justices construed Article 8 to require the United States to recognize these 
grants as if the land had in fact belonged to Spain between 1803 and 1819.$# These 
two Justices were inclined to accept such a construction because a declaration was 
appended to the treaty specifying that, notwithstanding Article 8, three specified 
grants did not need to be recognized.$$ One of these three specifically-excluded grants 
lay in territory that, according to the Court’s earlier analysis in Foster, did not belong to 
Spain between 1803 and 1819.$% In the view of the Chief Justice, this declaration 
made it “difficult to resist the construction that the excepted grants . . . would 
otherwise have been within [Article 8].”$& But Marshall went on to hold that, even if 
Article 8 were construed to apply to lands located within the disputed territory, the 
                                                
 
36 Sloss, supra note 1, at 150. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 151. 
39 Id. at 151 n.83 (citing United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. 127, 153 (1850); Menard’s Heirs v. 
Massey, 49 U.S. 293, 307 (1850)). 
40 See Vázquez, INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 4, at 159–61. 
41 Foster, 27 U.S. at 310. 
42 Id. at 149–50. 
43 See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 700–05; Vázquez, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STORIES, supra note 4, at 163. 
44 Foster, 27 U.S. at 313. 
45 Id. at 145–46. 
46 Id. at 147. 
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courts could not enforce the Spanish grants because Article 8 was non-self-
executing.$'  
Professor Sloss points to Supreme Court decisions, handed down after Marshall’s 
death, holding that individuals holding Spanish grants within this disputed territory 
acquired an inchoate or equitable interest in the land binding on the conscience of the 
sovereign.$( According to Professor Sloss, Foster is best read, in light of these 
subsequent cases, as holding that equitable interests of this sort may be transformed 
into perfect titles only through legislative action.$)  
But the Foster opinion leaves no doubt that the Court understood the need for 
legislation to arise from what the treaty itself had to say about the need for legislation, 
which in turn depended on the particular wording of Article 8. According to the 
Court, the matter turned on the “sound construction of the eighth article.”%* Legislation 
was necessary because Article 8 “addresses itself to the political, not the judicial 
department.”%! The question, according to the Court, was: “Do these words act directly 
on the grants, so as to give validity to those not otherwise valid; or do they pledge the 
faith of the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and confirm them?”%" Most 
importantly, the Court emphasized that “[t]he article . . . does not say that those 
grants are hereby confirmed. Had such been its language, it would have acted directly on 
the subject, and would have repealed those acts of congress which were repugnant to 
it; but its language [is different].”%# The Court did not distinguish between grants of 
perfect titles and grants of inchoate titles, nor did it point to any particular 
characteristic of the grants involved in the case.  
According to the Court’s reading of Article 8, therefore, even perfect grants would 
not have been directly enforceable in court. Had Article 8 provided that the grants 
were “hereby” confirmed, on the other hand, the treaty would have had the effect 
that Sloss claims it had: perfect grants would have been directly enforceable and 
inchoate grants would have been subject to implementing legislation. The fact that the 
Court distinguished the actual wording of Article 8 from a different wording that 
would have produced the result that Sloss defends shows that the Court was not 
reading Article 8 as Professor Sloss contends.  
                                                
 
47 Id. at 148–51. 
48 Sloss, supra note 1, at 152, nn.88–89 (citing Lessee of Pollard v. Files, 43 U.S. 591 (1844); 
Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353 (1840)). 
49 Id. at 149–52. 
50 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added). 
51 Id. (emphasis added). 
52 Id. (emphasis added). 
53 Id. at 314–15 (emphasis added). 
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The Court’s subsequent analysis in Percheman confirms the conventional 
understanding of Foster.%$ Had Marshall understood Foster’s non-self-execution 
holding to be limited to inchoate grants, his analysis in Percheman could have stopped 
upon concluding that Percheman involved a perfect grant. But the Court found it 
necessary in Percheman to revisit Foster’s reading of Article 8 as requiring legislative 
implementation.%% The Court thus apparently understood Foster to hold that even 
grants of perfect titles were unenforceable in the absence of implementing legislation. 
In reconsidering Foster’s holding, the Court again focused on the words of the Article 
8. But, this time, with the Spanish text before him, Marshall concluded that the words 
did not necessarily “stipulat[e] for some future legislative act,” as the Court had 
mistakenly concluded in Foster.%& 
In short, while Professor Sloss has offered an alternative basis on which the Court in 
Foster could perhaps have reached the same result, he has not shown that the Court in 
fact decided the case on such grounds. To the contrary, the conclusion that the Court 
based its decision on what the treaty itself had to say about whether the United States 
was required to “pass acts” is irresistible. While much about Foster is unclear, the 
Court’s understanding of the issue as one of treaty interpretation is not. 
Professor Sloss gives three reasons for rejecting this conclusion. First, he notes that 
“the claim that Article 8 requires legislative implementation . . . has no basis in the 
treaty text.”%' I agree, but that just means that the Court misread the treaty. The fact 
that the text does not support the Court’s conclusion does not show that the Court 
did not base its decision on the words of the treaty, any more than the fact that the 
Medellín Court misunderstood the meaning of the term “undertakes” in the U.N. 
Charter%( establishes that the Court in Medellín did not purport to be answering the 
self-executing question by reference to the words of that treaty.%) Second, Professor 
Sloss notes that it was already well established at the time “that international law does 
not govern the internal processes by which a nation implements its treaty 
obligations.”&* That is also true, but that, too, is a basis for criticizing the Court’s 
approach to the self-execution question, just as Professor Sloss, Justice Breyer&! and 
                                                
 
54 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–91 (1833). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 89 (emphasis added). 
57 Sloss, supra note 1, at 158. 
58 See Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 656. 
59 See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508–09 (2008). See also Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 
656. 
60 Sloss, supra note 1, at 159. 
61 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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I&" have criticized the Medellín majority’s focus on treaty text in answering the same 
question.  
Finally, Professor Sloss argues that the conventional interpretation of Foster and 
Percheman is inconsistent with the Court’s post-Percheman decisions, which “repeatedly 
affirmed that congressional legislation was necessary to perfect inchoate titles.”&# But 
these latter decisions are not inconsistent with the conventional interpretation of 
Foster. Under the Foster interpretation, because of the wording of Article 8, legislative 
implementation was necessary before the courts could enforce any Spanish grants, 
even perfect grants such as that involved in Percheman. That is why the Court had to 
revisit the self-execution question in Percheman. Having corrected its misconstruction 
of Article 8, the Court held in Percheman that the no legislation was required to 
authorize the courts to recognize Spanish grants of perfect titles.&$ But, since Article 8 
only required recognition of Spanish grants “to the same extent that the same grants 
would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of [Spain],” the 
U.S. courts were only required to recognize inchoate grants as inchoate.&% That is why 
the post-Percheman cases continued to require implementing legislation for grants in 
this category. If Professor Sloss is right about the constitutional need for legislation to 
transform inchoate grants into perfect grants, and if, as Professor Sloss maintains, the 
grant involved in Foster was indeed an inchoate one, then the Court in Foster might 
well have reached the same result in that case even if it had not misconstrued Article 8 
as requiring legislation across the board. Marshall could thus perhaps have avoided his 
unfortunate disquisition on treaties that are self-executing because of the parties’ 
intent, sparing us this problematic category of non-self-executing treaties.  
But, unfortunately, Marshall did not take that course. As a result, we were left with the 
highly problematic intent-based approach to determining when treaties require 
implementing legislation. Marshall himself eventually recognized his mistake in 
reading Article 8 to require legislation.&& I have argued that, consistent with the 
Court’s approach and language in Percheman, a treaty should not be read to reflect an 
intent to require implementing legislation unless it “stipulates for some future 
legislative act.”&' As noted, this approach to the intent-based category of non-self-
executing treaties should produce the same results as Professor Sloss’ approach. In 
                                                
 
62 See, e.g., Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 646–51. 
63 Sloss, supra note 1, at 159. 
64 Percheman, 32 U.S. at 65 (“Absolute or perfect grants, it is believed, would be protected 
by the law of nations, independent of the treaty. Some legislative recognition of their validity 
might indeed be necessary to sustain a suit upon them in our courts, but the national 
obligation to respect them could hardly be denied.”). 
65 Id. at 88. 
66 See Vázquez, INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 4, at 165–66. 
67 Id. at 89. 
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short, Foster is ripe for criticism and limitation, even outright overruling. But it is not 
susceptible to the reinterpretation that Professor Sloss proposes. 
Professor Sloss’ treatment of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster contrasts 
sharply with his treatment of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Medellín. As noted, 
Professor Sloss stretches mightily to avoid an interpretation of Foster that reflects 
misconceptions about the nature of treaties under international law. In examining 
Medellín, however, Professor Sloss offers an alternative rationale supporting the 
Court’s result, without claiming that the Court’s opinion can be read to adopt that 
rationale.&( In offering an alternative rationale, Professor Sloss is in good company. 
Virtually all scholars who have commented on Medellín—those who have defended its 
holding as well as those who have criticized it—have proffered alternative rationales 
for the Court’s holding.&)  
My treatment of Medellín, on the other hand, resembles Professor’s Sloss’ treatment of 
Foster.'* I have advanced a reading of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion that minimizes 
the problems it raises—prominently among them being the very problem that 
Professor Sloss cites as a reason for rejecting the conventional reading of Foster: its 
neglect of the fact that states negotiating treaties almost never address the need for 
implementing legislation.'! Is my treatment of Medellín subject to the criticism that I 
have directed at Professor Sloss’ treatment of Foster?  
I do not think so. First, the reading of Medellín that I offer is supported by some of 
the Court’s analysis in the opinion. Specifically, I have argued that Medellín can and 
should be read to hold that Article 94 of the U.N. Charter merely imposes an 
obligation on States-Parties to do their best to comply with the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ)’s judgments.'" If so understood, the Court’s conclusion that the treaty 
requires legislative implementation was correct. A treaty that obligates the states-
parties to do their best to comply is one that requires the exercise of political 
judgment. It is up to the political branches to determine what doing their best 
means.'# Admittedly, this interpretation is almost certainly wrong as a matter of treaty 
interpretation. Still, in my view, this interpretation is preferable to the alternatives 
because at least it would not upend the courts’ general approach to the judicial 
enforcement of treaties. Unlike Professor Sloss’ proposed reading of Foster, my 
                                                
 
68 Sloss, supra note 1, 182–87. 
69 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 5, at 132–33; Young, supra note 5, at 93–95; David H. Moore, 
Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 32, 33 
(2009); John T. Parry, Rewriting the Roberts Court’s Law of Treaties, 88 TEX. L. REV. 65, 65–67 
(2010). 
70 See infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
71 See supra notes 11, 28 and accompanying text. 
72 Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 4, at 660–65. 
73 See, e.g., id. at 630–31; Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 710–18. 
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proposed interpretation of Medellín finds some support in the Court’s reasoning. 
Specifically, my reading is supported by the Court’s statement that Article 94 was not 
directly enforceable because it does not say that the parties “shall” or “must” 
comply.'$ In so reasoning, the Court suggested that it read the treaty to leave the 
parties with some discretion to determine whether or not to comply with ICJ 
judgments. If the Court had understood Article 94 to impose a nondiscretionary 
obligation to comply with ICJ judgments, then the treaty would have effectively said 
that the parties “shall” or “must” comply.'% Concededly, this reading of the opinion is 
in tension with other parts of the Court’s analysis.'& But this latter fact points to 
another pertinent distinction between Foster and Medellín: because the latter opinion is 
self-contradictory, there is no single interpretation that would make sense of all 
aspects of the Court’s analysis.'' The Foster opinion, by contrast, though based on a 
misconception, is relatively clear. In sum, Professor Sloss’ reading of Foster is 
untenable, in my view, because it finds no affirmative support in the opinion and is 
inconsistent with the opinion’s main thrust, whereas my reading of Medellín is tenable 
because it is supported by some parts of the Court’s analysis and because no 
competing reading can be squared with the opinion as a whole.  
Professor Sloss does not claim that the alternative rationale he has offered for the 
result in the Medellín case is a tenable interpretation of the opinion the Court handed 
down. Presumably, he offers the alternative rationale in order to assuage concerns that 
the approach to self-execution that he defends would necessarily have required the 
courts to enforce the ICJ’s judgment in Avena.'( In my view, however, the alternative 
rationale is not convincing, and there is little need to be concerned about a reading of 
Article 94 as, of its own force, requiring the U.S. courts to comply with ICJ judgments 
holding that certain judicial remedies must be afforded to individuals. Professor Sloss 
argues that the Court might properly have refused enforcement of the ICJ’s judgment 
in Avena because the ICJ in Avena exceeded its jurisdiction.') (He offers this 
alternative rationale tentatively, as he admits that he is not sure that he would agree.(*) 
For reasons that I cannot go into here, I do not agree with the claim that the ICJ 
exceeded its jurisdiction by addressing remedial matters. Even if it did exceed its 
jurisdiction, however, I do not agree with Professor Sloss that this renders the 
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decision in Avena ultra vires and thus not binding on the United States.(! A litigant’s 
obligation to comply with a tribunal’s judgment cannot depend on the losing party’s 
agreement with the tribunal’s judgment—including its conclusion that it had 
jurisdiction over the case. And, in fact, the Statute of the ICJ, which has the force of a 
treaty, and is as such binding on the United States, makes it clear that the ICJ has 
jurisdiction to decide the scope of its jurisdiction, as Article 36(6) provides that “in 
the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be 
settled by the decision of the Court.”("  
In my view, there is no significant cause for concern. Professor Sloss is presumably 
trying to assuage concerns that the ICJ will render an exorbitant judgment and the 
U.S. courts will have no choice but to enforce it.(# But, first, the ICJ does not often 
render exorbitant judgments. Certainly, the relief required by the ICJ’s judgment in 
Avena was quite limited and, in my view, well supported.($ If the ICJ were to render 
an exorbitant judgment, the U.S. courts would not inevitably have to enforce it even if 
Article 94 were construed as making such judgments self-executing.(% The courts 
would not have to do so if Congress enacted a statute prohibiting them from doing 
so. Under the last-in-time rule, the later statute would prevail.(& My sense is that, 
despite the well-known obstacles to enacting federal legislation, a statute barring 
compliance with an exorbitant ICJ judgment would be enacted without difficulty. On 
the other hand, a statute requiring compliance with a reasonable judgment—which is 
what the Supreme Court in Medellín read Article 94 to require('—would likely be 
difficult to enact, as the federal government’s efforts to pass such a statute after 
Medellín have shown.(( Thus, in my view, there would have been no great cause to be 
concerned about a judgment interpreting Article 94 as imposing a nondiscretionary 
obligation to comply and holding that no intervening act of legislation was necessary 
to authorize the courts to enforce an ICJ judgment addressed to the courts. 
In sum, Professor Sloss treats Chief Justice Marshall as infallible, arguing that the 
Chief Justice could not have meant what he appears to have held because such a 
holding would rest on a mistake about international law. On the other hand, he does 
not resist a reading of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Medellín that he correctly 
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regards as resting on the same error. (He proposes an alternative rationale for the 
holding but does not claim that the Court embraced it.) Alas, Marshall was only 
human. In Percheman, Marshall recognized his error in Foster regarding Article 8 of the 
treaty; as I read Percheman, Marshall also urged greater caution in finding treaties to be 
non-self-executing. Chief Justice Roberts repeated Marshall’s early error in Foster while 
overlooking his course correction in Percheman. In my view, the reasoning that 
Professor Sloss attributes to Chief Justice Marshall in Foster should be viewed instead 
as an alternative rationale on which the Court could, and perhaps should, have relied. 
The alternative rationale that Professor Sloss advances for the Medellín outcome is not 
persuasive, but another rationale is available that would reconcile the holding with 
constitutional text and doctrine. Unlike Professor Sloss’ rationale for either Foster or 
Medellín, this alternative rationale—resting on an interpretation of Article 94 of the 
U.N. Charter as merely obligating the United States to do its best to comply with ICJ 
judgments—does find support in the Court’s opinion.  
